





































A Study from the Act of Apperception
Sambi OZAKI
Abstract
　This research considers issues of self-consciousness within the philosophy of Immanuel Kant (1724-1804). 
Self-consciousness generally involves the following difficulty: the subject of consciousness that conducts its own 
self-consciousness can not be grasped. This is considered to be one of the most significant problems in his pri-
mary work, Critique of Pure Reason as well. Regarding this problem, there has been a critique against Kant. 
When the subject of consciousness attempts to grasp its self in self-consciousness, there unavoidably has to be the 
very same self as a premise. This criticism comes from the standpoint that Kant understands self-consciousness to 
be a reflective consciousness that is thrown from meta-viewpoint.
　Based on this argument, this research primarily examines the Kantian interpretation of the issue of self-con-
sciousness and seeks to respond to this criticism. Subsequently, this research intends to discuss a substantial 
matter of self-consciousness representing what it means to have the very consciousness of “I.” Regarding the dis-
cussion of Kantian self-consciousness, it is inevitable to consider the relevance of Apperception. In particular, by 
focusing on the act of the Apperception, this paper will demonstrate that the subject of consciousness becomes 
aware of its existence at the very moment when Apperception is enacted. This existence-consciousness of the self 
is exactly what Kant has in mind when he refers to self-consciousness. 
　Furthermore, this consciousness should be regarded as a “sensation of the self.” In other words, it is the feeling 
of existence of which the subject of consciousness is aware. At this point, the true worth of the argument of Kan-
tian self-consciousness, that grasps the self of self-consciousness not as an explicit but as an implicit object, more 
precisely as a feeling of the self, will be discovered.
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して現象する通りに wie ich mir erscheine意識
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するのでもなければ、私が私自体である通りに
wie ich an mir selbst bin意識するのでもなく、
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能する働きである31。これは「私は思考しつつ実在
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思惟と
して「超越論的レベルでの Ich denke」を明示的な
4 4 4 4
自己意識とする一方、個々の経験的で「first-level
の思惟」を非明示的な
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implicit自己意識とする38。
　先述したとおり、経験主観にとって有意味な































































































































情 das Gefühl eines Daseins」を示すと語られる記述






































































あると筆者は解釈する。Cf. Camilla Serck-Hanssen, “Kant 
on Consciousness”, Psychology and Philosophy: Inquiries 
into the Soul from Late Scholasticism to Contemporary 
Thought, Sara Heinämaa, Martina Reuter eds., Springer 
Science+Business Media B.V., 2009, p. 139.
⑶　『純粋理性批判』においては、「超越論的統覚 transzen-













⑷　Cf. Dieter Henrich, “Self-Consciousness, A Critical Intro-
duction to A Theory”, Man and World 4th vol., Martinus 
Nijhoff, The Hague/Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1971, p. 
10f.
⑸　Cf. Henry E. Allison, Kant’s Transcendental Deduction: 
An Analytical-Historical Commentary, Oxford University 
Press, 2015, p. 341.また本稿では扱えないが、Allisonと同
様の観点から自己意識に関して議論をしている他の研究
のひとつとして以下のものを参照。Patricia Kitcher, Kant’s 





















































⑽　この言及は Ameriksの指摘に依る。Cf. Karl Ameriks, 
“Understanding Apperception Today”, Kant and Contempo-
rary Epistemology, Paolo Parrini ed., University of Florence, 
1994, p. 332f. ; Karl Ameriks, “From Kant to Frank: The Ine-
liminable Subject”, The Modern Subject: Conceptions of the 
Self in Classical German Philosophy, Karl Ameriks and 








































⒁　Thomas Powell, Kant’s Theory of Self-Consciousness, 
Oxford University Press, 1990, p. 61.
⒂　本稿で直接は引用しないが、この観点から詳しい議論
を展開している先行研究のひとつに以下のものがある。
Tobias Rosefeldt, Das logische Ich: Kant über den Gehalt 
des Begriffes von sich selbst, Philo Verlagsgesellschaft mbH, 
Berlin/ Wien, 2000, S. 49-82.
⒃　Vgl. Tobias Rosefeldt, „Wer oder was ist „das stehende 
und bleibende Ich”?”, Immanuel Kant: Kritik der Reinen Ver-
nunft, Hg. Georg Mohr und Marcus Willaschek, Akademie 





























































は以下の通りである。Rudolf Eisler, Wörterbuch der Phil-
osophischen Begriffe, Bd.3, E. S. Mitteler & Sohn, Berlin, 
1930, S. 140f. ; Joachim Ritter (hrsg.), Historisches Wörter-
buch der Philosophie, Bd.9, Schwabe & Co Verlag, Basel / 














ity」として解釈されるべきである。Cf. Wifrid Sellars, “… 
This I or He or It （The Thing） which Thinks…”, Essay in 
Philosophy and Its History, Wifrid Sellars ed., D. Reidel 
Publishing Company, Dordrecht, Holland, 1974, p. 79.
24　Henrich, 1971, p. 10f.
25　Ibd.
26　Karl Ameriks, “Kant and the Self: A Retrospective”, Fig-
uring the self: subject, absolute, and others in classical 
German philosophy, David E. Klemm and Günter Zöller 
eds., State University of New York Press, 1997, p. 61f.

























ている。Cf. Gray Banham, “Apperception and Spontaneity”, 
Kant Studies Online, http://www.garybanham.net/PAPERS_















から認められる。Cf. Ameriks, 1994, p. 337. ; Ameriks, 
1995, p. 226. ; Dieter Sturma, “Self and Reason: A Nonre-
ductionist Approach to the Reflective and Practical 
Transitions of Self-Consciousness”, The Modern Subject: 
Conceptions of the Self in Classical German Philosophy, 
Karl Ameriks and Dieter Sturma eds., University of New 
York Press, 1995, p. 213, n.10.
37　Cf. Ameriks, 1995, p. 225.
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43　Ameriks, 1995, p. 226.
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